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ASSIGNmENTS-EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENTS-CHECKS..KUHNES V. CAHILL,
104 N. W. 1025 (IowA) .- Held, the giving of a check on a general deposit
fund in a bank, amounts to an equitable assignment pro tanto of the fund.
The weight of authority, both in England and this country, is in
opposition to the above ruling. Laclede Bank v. Schuler, i2o U. S. 511;
Com. ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. American Life Insurance Co., 162 Pa. 586. The
provision of the negotiable instrument act, section i89, follows the cur-
rent American law. As construing this section see Baltimore etc. Ry. Co
v. First National Bank, 47 S. E. 837. The minority- ruling, however, is
set forth in Springfield Marine and Fire Insurance Co. v. Peck, io2 Ill.265; Farmers Bank and Trust Co. v. Newland, 97 Ky. 464. As to effect
between parties see Pease v. Laudaner, 63 Wis. 2o. But an order payable
out of a particular fund may operate as an equitable assignmeit Flor-
ence Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U. .S. 391; also Fortier v. Delgardo, 122
Fed. 604, where check operated as an assignment
BANKS AND BA14KING-INSOLVENcY-TITLE TO DEPOSIT.-CLARK V. TOR-
ONTO BANK ET AL., 82 PAc. 582 (KAN.).-Held, that where a bank fails
and passes into the hands of a receiver after it has issued a draft upon a
correspondent bank in which it has funds on deposit, and the drawee has
notice of the receivership before the draft is presented for payment, the
title to such deposit passes to the receiver, and the holder of the draft, in
the absence of any special circumstances, is entitled to no priority over
ether creditors of the failed bank.
The giving of a draft does not operate as an assignment of the funds
standing to the credit of the drawer. Duncan v. Berlin, 60 N. Y. 153.
Checks drawn in the usual form, not describing any particular fund, or
using any words of transfer of the whole or any part of any amount stand-
ing to the credit of the drawer, but containing only the usual request, are
of the same legal effect as an inland bill of exchange, and do not amount
to an assignment of the funds of the drawer in the bank. Lunt v. Bank
of North America, 49 Barb. 221; the almost universally accepted rule be-
ing that to constitute an assignment, the order must specify the particular
fund upon which it is drawn. Atty. Gen. v. Continental Life Ins. Co.,
71 N. Y. 325. There are, on the other hand, authorities which hold that adraft operates as an assignment of the funds on which it is drawn pro tanto
from the very time it is drawn and delivered, on the ground that, the as-
signor having received a consideration for the draft, his equities are. in-ferior to those of the payee of the draft, and as the assignee stands in the
shoes of the assignor he has no better equities than the assignor. First
National Bank v. Coates, 8 Fed. 540; Daniels on Negot. Instruments, sec.
1643.
CARRms-Loss OF FPEIGHT-DAmAGES-LIMrrATION.-HAYES V. ADAMS
ExiEss Co., 62 ATL. 284 (N. J.).-On delivering to a common carrier adrop curtain of ordinary character and value, the shipper received as a
voucher therefor an instrument in which it was stated that, when the
shipper omits to declare the value of goods, he agrees that the value does
not exceed $5o.oo. Held, that the responsibility of the carrier for the real val-
ue in case of loss was not thereby restricted unless the shipper had knowledge
of the stipulation; and his knowledge that the carrier's charges depend
upon the value of the goods is not sufficient to render the limit of liability
obligatory.
In this country the rule is well established, that notices limiting liability
are of no avail, unless assented to by the shipper. Transkortation Co. v. New-hall, 24 Ill 466; Dorr v. Navigation Co., ii N. Y. 485. Burden of proof
is upon the carrier to establish the contract qualifying his liability, if he claims
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that one exists. McMillan v. R. R. Co., 16 Mich. 79; Navigation Co. v.
Bank, 6 Ho.w. 344. A notice can at the best only amount to a proposal for
a special contract which requires the assent of the other party. Hollister
v. Nawlan, ig Wend. 234. But it is held that acceptance of a bill of lading
as receipt constitutes an assent to the terms embodied in it; Kirkland v.
Dinsvware, 62 N. Y. 171; Groce v. Adams, ioo Mass. 505. But to have this
effect the receipt or bill must be delivered before the transportation is entered
upon by the carrier and while it is still in the power of the shipper to re-
call the goods. Transportation Co. v. Furtlinman, 149 Ill. 66; Wilde v.
Transportation Co., 47 Iowa, 247. If the shipper does nothing to mislead
the carrier and the latter makes no inquiries, the shipper is not bound lo
state the character or value of the goods. R. R. v. Fraloff, IOO U. S. 24.
But if the carrier has given general notice that he will not be liable unless
the value is made known to him at the time of delivery, such notice, if
brought home to the knowledge of the owner is as effectual in qualifying
the acceptance of the goods as a special agreement. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend.
85; Philips v. Earle, 8 Pick. 182. The effect of notices of this class is to
do away with the necessity for a special inquiry in each case. Batson v.
Donovan, 4 Barn. and Ald. 21.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASSIFICATION OF CITIES-SPECIAL LEGISLA-
TION.-SAMPLE V. PITTSBURG, 62 ATL. 201 (PA.).-Held that an act, provid-
ing that, where two cities are contiguous and in the same county, the smaller
may be annexed to the larger, where the only two cities in the Commonwealth
that are contiguous and in the same county are Pittsburg and Alleghany,
is unconstitutional, since, it is evident that the act was intended to legis-
late locally for them.
This case illustrates how far the courts will, in construing a statute,
consider the motives behind legislation. It is a fundamental principle of con-
stitutional law that the courts will not inquire into legislative motives ex-
cept as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts or may be inferrable
from their operation considered with reference to the condition of the coun-
try and existing legislation. Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 7o3. But in this
class of cases the courts hold that classification of cities must not be purely
arbitrary and without reasonable necessity. Thus it was held that a classi-
fication into seven classes was unconstitutional in Pennsylvania but that a
division into three classes, ode of which included a single city, was reasonable.
Wheeler v. Phila., 77 Pa. 338. And an act applicable only to such cities as may
adopt it is void. Reading v. Savage, i2o Pa. 198. Thus it is very often diffi-
cult to distinguish these cases. The following general principles have been
generally recognized. Legislation must not be special or .local and must re-
late to corporate municipal powers. In re Washington Street, 118 Pa. 192.
If the classification is upon its face artificial or unnecessary the courts will
declare it void. Ayer's App., 122 Pa. 266.
ComI oN CARRIERs-EMPLOYEES AS PASSENGERs.-SouTHERN INDIANA Ry.
Co. v. MESSICK, 74 N. E. 1097 (IND.).-Held, that a servant employed by a
railroad company and riding home after the day's work on a work train, is
an employee, and not a passenger.
It has been held that a person, in the employ of a railroad, is a passen-
ger when being carried to and from his woTk on a work-train Gillenwater v.
Ry. Co., 5 Ind. 339, 61 Am. Dec. ioi. But the weight of authority has de-
cided that where a person engaged in the construction or repair of a railroad,
as a laborer working with a gravel train or a carpenter repairing a bridge,
is carried to and from his work without charge and is injured in the course
of transportation by the negligence of the carder or his servants, such car-
rier will not be liable to the employee as a passenger. Ryan v. Ry. Co., 23
Penn. St. 384; Russel v. R. R. Co., 17 N. Y. 134; Seaver v. R. R. Co., 14
Gray 466. An employee of a carrier of passengers while riding in connection
with the performance of his duty is not a passenger. Gillshannon v. R. R.
Corp., io Cush. 228; Vick v. R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 267. But if the employee
is travelling on his own business, though he pays no fare, he is a passenger.
R. R. Co. v. Muhling, 3o Ill. 9; P. & R. R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 Howard 468.
If a reduction of wages is made on account of the transportation furnished
the employee, he is is then considered a passenger. O'Donnell v. R. R. Co.,
59 Pa. St 239.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL LICENSE TAx-STATE AGENCIES.-SoUTH
CAROLINA V. UNITED STATES, 26 SP. CT. iio.-Held, that the Federal govern-
ment may levy the license taxes, prescribed by the internal revenue laws for
dealers in intoxicating liquors, upon the dispensing and selling agents of a
state, which, in the exercise of its sovereign power, has taken charge of the
business of selling such liquors.
This decision emphasizes an important qualification of the doctrine recog-
nized ever since the case of McColloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. namely,
that when a state assumes control of an industry or engages in an activity
which is not an instrumentality of government, its agencies are not exempt
from taxation by Congress. It had already been decided that where a state
engages in selling liquors it cannot control the importation. Vance v. Vander-
cock, 17o U. S. 438; Sholmberger v. Pa., 171 U. S. I. The United States
cannot tax the salaries of state officials. The Collector v. Day,. i Wall. 113
nor the revenue of a municipal corporation derived from its loan of capital
to a railroad. U. S. v. B. & 0. R., 17 Wall. 322. Nor may it tax the income
of municipal bonds held by an individual. Pollock v. F. L. & T. Co., 158
U. S. 6oi. In all the foregoing cases the tax was upon an agency of govern-
ment The distinction now made clear was suggested in the case of Natonal
Bank v. Com. 9 Wall. 353. It was there said: "It is only when the state law
incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the government
that it becomes unconstitutional." A charge which is not in its nature a tax
may be levied. This was decided in the Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 58o,
and in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, where a tax upon circulating
notes of state banks for the purpose of destroying their circulation was
held valid.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FORMER JEOPARDY-CONVICTION IN APPELLATE TRr-
BUNAL.-TRONO V. UNITED STATES, 26 SP. CT. 121.-Held, that the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands may, upon appeal of the accused, reverse the
conviction below and convict for higher offense.
"No man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the
same offense" is from Blackstone, 4 B!. Com. 335. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend.
matter of practice, Winsor v. Reg., 7 B. & S. 276. But in this country the prin-
ciple is fundamental, has been adopted by the Federal Constitution, and, al-
though that clause is not binding upon the states, it is recognized by Consti-
tution or under the common law in all the states.U. S. v. Keen, I McLean
429; Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend. 85, ioo. As a general rule a party
to a cause may waive any right the law has given him. Brown v. Webber,
6 Cush. 56o This right is waived by application for a new trial. Gannon v.
People, 127 Ill. 5o7; People v. Hardson, 61 Cal. 378. The courts are, how-
ever, in direct conflict upon the extent of this waiver. The dissenting opin-
ion shows the great weight of authority opposed to this decision. The rul-
ing judge, however, has shown the weighty reason favoring it and it is sig-
nificant that New York, Missouri, Virginia, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas and
Kentucky adopted this rule by statute or constitutional amendment after the
courts had fixed the law by judicial decision. See editorial comment.
CONTRACTs-LoCATION OF DEPOTS-PUBLIC PoLic.-END RIGHT OF WAY
& TowNsIE Co. v. LHLE, 82 Pac. 811-A contract Which provides that, for a
consideration, the location of a railroad corporation shall be at a certain
without regard to the question of the needs of the people, or the public con-
point, without regard to the question of the needs of the people, or the public
convenience, is held to be against public policy. Burford, C. J. Burnell and Pan-
coast, JJ., dissenting.
A contract with a land owner, in consideration of certain land for a right
of way, to erect a depot thereon, is valid. Watte-son v. Railroad Co., 74 Pa.
St. 2o8. Equity will not compel specific performance of aL contract to locate
a depot at a certain point and at no other point in a town. Marsh v. Farburg
& W. W. R. R. Co., 64 Ill. 414. Company may contract to locate a station at
one point but may not contract not to locate at other points. Tex. & St. L. R.
R. vz. Roberts, 6o Tex. 545. A contract not to build a depot at a certain place
for one year is not per se against public policy. Tucker v. Allen, 16 Kan. 323.
A contract to build a depot at a certain place would not be against public
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policy. Workman v. Campbell, 46 Mo. 3o5. Nor would a contract to maintain
it there perpetually. R. R. Co. v. Dawson, 62 Tex. 26o. The authorities
agree that the railroad company may not bind itself either to build or refrain
from building depots in such a manner that an inducement may be furnished
to a possible neglect of the convenience of their patrons. R. R. Co. v. Mat-
thew, 104 Ill. 257 and note to R. R. Co. v. Ryan, ii Kan. 6o2.
EJECTMENT-WHEN LIES-STRETcHING WIREs ovER LAND.-BUTLFR v.
FRONTIER TEL. Co., 92 N. Y. SupP. 684.-Under the N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. de-
daring an action of ejectment to be "an action to recover immediate posses-
sion of property," held, that an owner may maintain ejectment against one
who has taken possession of the space above the surface of the land to the ex-
tent of stretching wires across it. Nash and Hiscock, JJ., dissenting.
The question involved in the present case is one which has been variously
decided. At common law ejectment would not lie for anythingwhereon entry
could not be made. 2 Crabb on Real Property, 710. It was first held in New
York that it would lie for anything attached to the soil of which the sheriff
could deliver possession. Jackson v. May, 16 Johns. 184. But later in Sherry
v. Frecking, 4 Duer 452, such action was held maintainable where the in-
jury consisted of overhanging eaves, on the theory that land extends upwards
as well as downwards as far as the owner of the subjacent soil may see fit
to extend it; 3 Kent's Coin. 487; this case being overruled by Aiken v. Bene-
dict, 39 Barb. 4oo, and Vrooman v. Jackson, 62 Hun. 362, holding nuisance to
be the proper remedy. Thus the present case reverses the former New York
rule and is in accord with the weight of recent authority. Murphy v. Bolger
Bros., 6o Vt 723; McCourt v. Eckstein 22 Wis. 153. But that nuisance is the
proper remedy, see Wood, Nuis. Sec. lo5; Tyler, Eject, 38.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-AFECTIONs-ALIENATION.-GREGG v. GREGG, 75 N.
E. (IND.).-Held, that a divorced wife is entitled to maintain an action
against her former mother-in-law for alienation of the affections of her hus-
band by acts maliciously done, which were calculated to produce such result.
There is very little conclusive authority on this proposition in the decis-
ions of the courts of this country or in England. Duffies v. Duffies, 8 L. IL A.
42o. At common law a wife could not maintain an action against one who
wrongfully and maliciously enticed her husband from her. 2 Bl. Com. p. 142
This disability of the wife was due to the legal fiction that the husband and
wife were one person, i. e., the husband. Walker v. Cronin, lO7 Mass. 555.
Some courts go so far as to hold that not even under the modern statutes,
allowing married women to sue, can a wife maintain an action against anoth-
er for enticing away her husband or alienating his affections. Tiffany, Do-
mestic Relations, p. 79. By the great weight of authority, however, since the
loss of services is not necessary to the action and the right to each other's
society and comfort is reciprocal, a wife may maintain such action. Warren
v. Warren, 5o N. W. 842; Mehrhoff v. Mehrhoff, 26 Fed. 13. A case directly
in point, Williams v. Williams, 50 Col. 51, holds that a wife may maintain an
action against a mother-in-law who wrongfully enticed her husband to aban-
don her.
INSURANCE-BENEFIcIAL ASSOCIATIONS-WAARANTIEs OF ASSUmsD.-CALD-
WELL V. GRAND LODGE UNIrD WORKMEN OF CALIFORNIA 82 Pac. 781. (CAL.).
-Held, that one who joins a beneficial association and agrees to abide by
and conform to all rules and regulations warrants statements made as to
relationship of beneficiary to him.
An application for membership directing payment to "M. H., wife" is
not a warranty that M.H. is applicant's wife as applicant is not yet a member
and so not bound by the constitution. A. 0. U. W. v. Hutchinson, 6 Md. 399.
Where the beneficiaries are limited to wife and children a false statement that
beneficiary is applicant's wife vitiates the policy. Smith v. Baltimore & 0. R.
Co., 81 Mo. 412. Stipulation that violation of a "condition' shall render the
contract void does not constitute a statement a warranty where the statement
is referred to as a "representation." Vivar v. K. of P., 52 N. J. Law 455. Nor
is failure to disclose the existence of another living wife a fraud upon the
association. Story v. Williamsburgh, etc., 95 N. Y. 474. Even if applicant
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be honestly mistaken in his statements his certificate will be void if it con-
tains a clause that the answers are "truthful and full." Johnson v. Chosen
Friends, io N. J. Law 346. But that statements affect applicant's rights onlyin so far as he knows them to be untrue see Thomas v. A. 0. U. W., 12 Wash.
5oo. Where the application requires applicant to state "so far as he knew"
facts concerning relatives and to "answer" questions about himself, the latter
statements were held to be warranties. Mayer v. Eq. Life Assn., 49 Hun. 336.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-DAMAGEs.-BUTLER v. HOBOKEN PRINTING & PUB-
LISHING Co., 62 At. 272. (N. J.).-In an action for libel, although the words
are actionable per se, held, damages can not be assessed for physical sickness
alleged to have been caused by libelous publication.
Numerous suits by the plaintiff have been brought throughout the country
against different newspapers for copying and printing a defamatory article.
The damages in the above case were assessed at $3,ooo. In a suit by her for
the publication of the same article in the Scranton Truth, Butler v. Barret
and Jordan, 13o Fed. 944, the amount recovered was but $goo. In the latter
case, however, no special damage, as ill health was taken into account. A
similar action was brought recently in the Federal Court in Hartford. Butler
v. Morning News of Bridgeport, and an appeal has been taken to the Circuit
Court of the district of New York. The damages awarded in this case were$,550.
Where words charged are actionable per se, jury may consider mental
suffering as an element of damage, Warner v. Publishing Co., 132 N.Y. 181;
Graybill v. DeYoung, 141 Cal. 323; but mental suffering alone does not
constitute such special damage as will" support an action where words are
not themselves libelous. Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54; Lynch v.
Knight, 9 H. L. C. 598. Sickness and incapacity to labor have, as a rule,
been deemed too remote consequences of slanderous words; the contrary
holding being entitled to little weight Leliff v. Jennings, 61 Tex. 458.
LimiTATIoN OF ACTIONS-ACKNOWLEDGENT-SUFFICIENCY.-ScHUCHLER
v. COOPER, 62 ATL. 261. (DEL.).-Held, a statement by a debtor to a creditor
that the debtor did not have the money to make payment, but that his
farm was big enough to pay the bill, did not amount to an acknowledgment
sufficient to revive the debt, as against limitations.
An acknowledgment of a similar nature to the one under consideration
was held to be sufficient to revive the debt against the statute of limita-
ions. Walsh v. Mayar, III U. S. 31. General rule is there must be an ex-
press promise of the debtor to pay the debt or else an express acknowledg-
ment from which his promise to pay may be inferred. Shepherd v. Thomp-
son, 122 U. S. 231. A merd acknowledgment, though in writing, of the
debt, as having once existed, is not sufficient to raise an implication of such
new promise. To have this effect there must be a distinct and unequivocal
acknowledgment of the debt as still subsisting as a personal obligation.
Shepherd v. Thompson, supra. Judge Story said the statute was not de-
signed merely to raise a presumption of payment of a just debt, from lapse
of time, but was intended as a statute of repose. Bell v. Morrison, I Pet351. From an acknowledgment of a debt-under circumstances that indi-
cate a willingness or liability to pay the same, the law will imply a promise
to pay. Green v. Coos Bay Co., 23 Fed. 67. The principle to be adduced
from these cases is that in addition to the admission of a present subsisting
debt, there must be either an express promise, or circumstances from
which an implied promise may fairly be presumed. Moore v. Bank of Col-
umbia, 6 Pet. 93. Some states have a rule more lenient to the creditor than
the above, Foster v. Smith, 12 Conn. 449. Other states require, by
virtue of a Code, that the new promise must be in writing. Choce v. Troff-
ard, i16 Mass. 529; Burns v. Harvell, 32 Ga. 6o2; Cleveland v. Duryea,
I Cin. R 324.
MASTER AND SERVANT-EmPLOYER'S LIABILIy AcTs-FELow SERVANTS.-
FAInH v. N. Y. C. & H. R R Co., 95 N. Y. SuPP. 774.-Held, that a foreman
or inspector of boiler repairs, having a gang of men under his direction in
a roundhouse, of which another had general supervision, was acting as a
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superintendent, within the meaning of the Employer's Liability Act, when
in the absence of the superintendent he was directing boiler repairs.
Employer's Liability Acts which have been adopted in several of the
states are framed upon the same plan as the English statute, passed in
i88o. 43 & 44 Vict. Cap. 42. The purpose and effect of these acts have been
to enlarge the employer's common-law liability. At common law a super-
intendent was a fellow-servant. Howels v. London Steel Co., L. R. IO Q. B.
63; Rogers v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 144 Mass. i98. But in Ohio and Kentucky
all employees have been allowed to recover in the absence of statute. Lit-
tle Miami v. Stevens, 2o Ohio 415; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Collins,
20 Duvall (Ky.) 114. However this may be, the one purpose of the stat-
ute clearly was to prevent the plaintiff from assuming the risk of a superin-
tendent's negligence. Malcolm v. Fuller, 152 Mass. i6o. The courts have
not clearly defined "a superintendent" and there has been much doubt
in the interpretation of the words "sole and principal duty" which are used
in all statutes. Obviously each case must stand upon all the circumstances
connected with it. It has been decided that mere superintendence is not
always enough to bring the case within the Act Onid v. O'Leary, 164 Mass.
387. Nor does the fact that the employee has charge of the ways, works,
machinery, or plant, fix his character as a superintendent Staffers v. Gen-
eral Steam Nay. Co. io Q. B. D. 356. Negligence must occur not only dur-
ing the period of superintendence but in the exercise of it Fitzgerald v.
B. & A. R. R. Co., 156 Mass. 293. A servant may at times act as a super-
intendent Cushman v. Chase, 156 Mass. 342.
MuNIcIPA. CoRPoRATioNs-PoLIcE PowER-B LWRODs.-CrrY oF PAS-
SAIC v. PATERsoN BILL PosTING Co., 62 ATL. 267 (N. J.).-A city ordinance
requiring that signs or billboards shall be constructed not less than ten feet
from the street line, held, a regulation not necessary for public safety and not
justified as an exercise of the police power, reversing 71 N. J. L. 75, 58 Atl.343. There has been a determined effort by municipal corporations during the
past few years to regulate the size and location of advertising billboards but
these ordinances have in many cases been declared invalid as an attempt to
appropriate private property without compensation. Bill Posting Sign Co. v.
Atlantic City, 58 At. 342 (N. J.). The first American case on the subject of
billboards was Crawford v. Topeka, 5i Kan. 756, where ordinance prohib-
iting such signs within a certain distance of sidewalk was held invalid. The
satie result was reached in City of Chicago v. Gunning System, 114 Ill. App. 377,
the regulation here applying to size, location, height, and material of signs;
so an ordinance forbidding erection of signs visible from a public park was
void. Com. v. Boston Adv. Co., i88 Mass. 348; like ordinance in N. Y. City
restraining the use of lots adjacent to parks for such purposes was invalidated.
People v. Green, 83 N. Y. Sup. 460. The most recent decision in this country is
Bryan v. Chester, 6i Atl. 894 (Pa.), where an ordinance prohibiting the use
of fences for advertising atid erection of billboards, was clearly held unconsti-
tutional. The courts of New York have, however, taken a more popular, if
less legal, view of billboard legislation. An ordinance that no billboard should
be erected more than 6 ft. high without permission of the city council was de-
clared valid as reasonable police regulation. Rochester v. West, x64 N. Y. 510;
like holding in Gunning System v. City of Buffalo, 77 N. Y. Supp. 987, for
billboards over 7 ft. in height.. The Federal Courts for New York have fol-
lowed the law of that state in regarding billboards as nuisances; Whitmier v.
Buffalo, 118 Fed. 773. But the ordinance was held to have no retroactive
effect The California courts also seem to have followed the New York doc-
trine. In re Wilshire, 103 Fed. 62o.
MARRIAGE--EVIDENCE-CoNSENT.--STATE v. WILSON, 62 ATL. 227 (DEL.).
-Held, that, although the witness had lived with the accused as his wife
without having been married to him, had introduced him as her husband to
her family, and had signed a bail bond in his name as his wife, such facts
did not prove a marriage so as to render her incompetent as a witness.
Consensus, non concubitus, facit matrimonium is a rule taken from the
civil law and recognized as a fundamental principle to-day. Dalrymple v. Dal-
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rymple, 17 Eng. Rul. Cas. ii. Hence evidence must establish matrimonial
consent. i Fras. Husb. and Wife, 399; Campbell v. Campbell, L. R. I H. L.
See. 200. Marriage cannot be proved by cohabitation alone. Com. v. Stump,
53 Pa. 132. And acknowledgment to avoid suspicion does not appear to be
enough. Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige 574. The evidence, however, need not be di-
rect. Upon showing of certain facts presumption will arise which may be-
come unanswerable. Campbell v. Campbell, supra. The proof, to raise such
a presumption, must be that the parties held themselves out as married and
assumed the rights and duties of the relationship. Their reputation must be
general and consistent with matrimonial cohabitation and must not have been
illicit in its inception unless facts clearly show a subsequent matrimonial con-
sent. Dysart Peerage Case, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 514; Rundle v. Pegram, 49 Miss.
756; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 46 Hun. 40. In criminal actions where proof of mar-
riage would be proof of guilt the presumption will not be entertained or is re-
butted by the presumption of innocence. In such cases there must be actual
proof of marriage. Morriss v. Miller, 4 Burr. 56; Clayson v. Wardell, 4
Comst. 242. Where statutes provide a legal ceremony they are construed as
merely directory unless there is an express provision that marriages not fol-
lowing the statute shall be void. Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76.
NEGLIGENcE-BURDEN OF PROOF-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. -AXELROD V.
NEW YORK CITY RY., 95 N. Y. Supp. IO72-Held, that in an action for
injuries, plaintiff has the burden of proving freedom from contributory negli-
gence. Patterson, J. dissenting.
The decisions upon this point are in direct conflict. The rule has been
stated to be that the burden is on the plaintiff to show affirmatively by a pre-
ponderance of sufficient evidence not only that the negligence of the de-
fendant contributed to the accident but also that the plaintiff was entirely free
from negligence proximately causing the injury. Thomas, Negligence, 357;
Chisholm v. State, 141 N. Y. 246. On the other hand it is said that con-
tributory negligence is purely a matter of defense. Randall v. Northern Tel.
Co., 54 Wis. 140; Robinson v. W. P. R. Co., 48 Cal. 4o9. The weight of au-
thority seems to be against the present case. McKimble v. B. & M. Railroad,
139 Mass. 542; Penn. Canal Co. v. Bently, 66 Penn. St. 30. The greatest neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant will not cure the least negligence con-
tributory to the injury on the part of the plaintiff. Griffin v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co.,
40 N. Y. 34. Some states, however, adopt the doctrine of comparative
negligence, holding that although the injured person has contributed slightly to
his own injury, yet recovery may be had if the defendant was grossly negli-
gent. Chicago etc. R. v. Johnson, x6 Ill. 2o6; Houston etc. R. Co. v. Gorbett,
49 Tex. 473.
SLAVERY-RIGHT OF INHERITANCE-JOHNSON V. SHEPHERD, 39 So. 223 (ALA.)
-Slaves cohabited and had a child before the war. Upon the death of the moth-
er the father commenced a cohabitation with another slave which continued
until after the close of the war, resulting in the birth of another child.
Held, that though the second child born after the war, was legitimate, he
could not inherit from first child who was illegitimate.
It was formerly the law when slavery existed in this country that a slave
could not marry, because he could not make a valid contract; Hall v. United
States, 92 U.S. 27; because the duties of slaves were inconsistent with those of
a husband or a wife; Malinda v. Gardner, 24 Ala. 719; and because a slave
was property. Howard v. Howard, 6 Jones (N. C.) 235. But after emancipa-
tion the legal relation of man and wife attached upon the theory of a common-
law marriage. Washington v. Washington, 69 Ala. 281. Hence where slav-
ery was recognized, in the absence of statute, legitimacy of colored offspring
was determined by whether birth of child was before or after Sept. 29,
1865. Malinda v. Gardner, supra. No such distinction, however, in non-slave
state. Norris V. Williams, 39 Ohio. St. 554.
